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Abstract
This paper examines the protability of horizontal merger in an open econ-
omy. We nd that duopoly is a necessary, but not su¢ cient, condition for
domestic merger to be protable. A cross-border merger, however, can be
protable from any market structure.
JEL classication: L4, F2
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1 Introduction
In an important contribution to the literature on incentives for rms to merge, Salant,
Switzer and Reynolds (1983) establish that a bilateral merger from an initial Cournot
equilibrium with linear demand is unprotable, except in the case of duopoly. One
strand of subsequent research has explored conditions that might augment the prof-
itability of merger, such as the existence of cost savings (Perry and Porter, 1985),
product di¤erentiation advantages (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985) or more complex
(non-linear) demand functions (Cheung, 1992 and Faulí-Oller, 1997). In this paper
we revert to Salant, Switzer and Reynoldss constant cost, homogeneous product,
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linear demand framework to examine the protability of merger in an open econ-
omy. More specically, we ask: for what congurations of market structure and trade
costs, if any, will merger be protable? Using a two-country model, we consider
both within-country (domestic) and cross-border (international) mergers. We
nd that, under trade conditions, duopoly is a necessary, but no longer su¢ cient,
condition for protable domestic merger, but international merger can be protable
from any market structure.1
2 The Model
We consider a homogeneous product which can be produced and consumed in either,
or both, of two countries, i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: We suppose that each country has an
identical linear inverse demand function
Pi = a Qi: (1)
Production costs comprise a constant marginal cost which is the same for all rms
and, for simplicity, set to zero. In addition, exports are subject to a trade cost, t,
per unit of output. We let ni and nj denote the number of rms located in countries
i and j respectively. We assume that the outcome of competition between rms is a
Cournot equilibrium in quantities and that there is no arbitrage. This implies that
the price prevailing in country i can di¤er from that in country j by more than t.
Prots for a representative rm based in country i are given by
i = Piyi + (Pj   t)xi; (2)
1A related, but di¤erent, issue is the change in the protability of merger that would result from
a change in trade cost or unilateral tari¤. This question has been examined by Long and Vousden
(1995), Falvey (1998) and Gaudet and Kanouni (2004).
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where yi denotes the sales of a rm in country i to its home market and xi its exports
to country j.
The problem of a representative rm in country i is to maximise (2), holding
outputs of rival rms xed and subject to non-negativity constraints on xi and yi.
We assume, henceforth, that domestic output is strictly positive in equilibrium. The
rst order conditions, using an asterisk to denote Cournot equilibrium values, for this
problem are
P i   yi = 0 (3)
and
P j   t  xi  0
xi  0
9
>=
>;
; (4)
where a right hand brace indicates a pair of complementary inequalities, one of which
must hold with equality.
Noting that P i is a function of y

i and x

j alone, whilst P

j is a function of y

j and
xi alone, conditions (3) and (4) can be solved simultaneously to yield
xi (ni; nj) = max

0;
a  (nj + 1)t
ni + nj + 1

(5)
and
yi (ni; nj) = (a+ njt)=(ni + nj + 1), x

j(ni;nj) > 0;
yi (ni; nj) = a=(ni + 1); x

j(ni;nj) = 0:
(6)
In the case where exports from both countries are zero, (5) - (6) reduce to the
standard conditions for Cournot equilibrium in each country in which rms make
prots of
Ai (ni) =

a
ni + 1
2
: (7)
By inspection of (5), the maximum trade cost compatible with international trade
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taking place (i.e. xi ; x

j > 0) is given by
t < max

a
ni + 1
;
a
nj + 1

 t (8)
and for the symmetric case where ni = nj = n this threshold level of trade cost is
t =
a
n+ 1
: (9)
For an equilibrium involving trade, substitution from (5) and (6) into (1) and (2),
after some rearrangement, yields:
i (ni; nj; t) =

2a2 + 2n2j t
2   2anjt2 + t2

ni + nj + 1
: (10)
It is convenient to decompose this prot into the elements deriving from the home
and overseas markets. For a rm located in country i, we denote these prots as
ii(ni; nj; t) and 
j
i (ni; nj; t) respectively and note that i(ni; nj; t)  ii(ni; nj; t) +
ji (ni; nj; t): Substitution from (5) and (6) into (1) yields
ii(ni; nj; t) =

a+ njt
ni + nj + 1
2
(11)
and
ji (ni; nj; t) =

a  (nj + 1)t
ni + nj + 1
2
: (12)
Similarly for a rm in country j; j(ni; nj; t)  jj(ni; nj; t) + ij(ni; nj; t); where
jj(ni; nj; t) =

a+ nit
ni + nj + 1
2
(13)
and
ij(ni; nj; t) =

a  (ni + 1)t
ni + nj + 1
2
: (14)
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2.1 Merger under Trade
We consider rst an initial equilibrium with trade taking place and consider two
possible forms of merger. In what we term a domestic merger two rms in country i
form a single rm and in what we term an international merger one rm in country
i joins with one rm in country j:
With a domestic merger two rms forgo their individual prots i(ni; nj; t) but
take a share of prots that are enhanced through the reduction in domestic competi-
tion. Thus, the gain to a domestic merger in a trade equilibrium in which ni = nj = n,
can be written as
GD(n; t) = ii(ni   1; nj; t) + 
j
i (ni   1; nj; t)  2ii(ni; nj; t)  2
j
i (ni; nj; t): (15)
With an international merger, we need to consider three types of rms. Following
such a merger there will be n   1 rms located wholly in country i, n   1 rms
located in country j and one newly merged rm which has a production base in
each country. The newly merged rm is not the same as existing rms in that it
can supply either market from a domestic production unit. Therefore, in setting its
output in each country it can act like a domestic rm in that country; there is no
incentive for it to produce for export because by producing domestically it can save
trade costs. The multinational rms impact on total production can therefore be
deduced by analogy with a Cournot equilibrium in which domestic output in country
i is determined as if there are n domestic Cournot competitors and n   1 overseas
competitors, whilst output for export from country i is determined as if there are
n   1 rms competing over exports facing n overseas competitors. The position in
country j is symmetric to this. International merger, therefore, has the e¤ect of
reducing by one the number of exporters serving each market but leaving the number
of domestic producers unchanged. Thus, the gain to an international merger in a
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trade equilibrium in which ni = nj = n, can be written as
GI(n; t) = ii(ni; nj   1; t) + 
j
j(ni   1; nj; t)  i(ni; nj; t)  j(ni; nj; t): (16)
In their autarky setting, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) demonstrate that
a merger is protable only if there are two rms in the initial Cournot equilibrium.
Does this result hold under trade? Proposition 1 addresses this question in regard to
domestic and international merger.
Proposition 1 For domestic merger, GD(n; t) < 0 for all n and 0  t < t whilst
for international merger there exists a threshold level of trade costs, btI(n) such that
GI(n; t) < 0 when t < btI(n), but GI(n; t) > 0 when btI(n) < t < t
Proof. Setting ni = nj = n, substituting from (11) and (12) into GD(n; t) and
di¤erentiating with resect to t the resulting rst order condition implies that GD(n; t)
is maximised at a trade cost of t(n) = a2n2+2n+1 . Substitution of this value of t into
GD(n; t) shows that the latter is negative for n  2 thus establishing the result for
domestic merger. After setting ni = nj = n, substituting from (11) and (12) into
GI(n; t) and equating to zero, the critical (zero-gain) value of trade cost can be solved
for as btI(n) = 8an3 10an 2a2(4n4+12n3+7n2 2n 1) : For all n  2, btI(n) lies in the range (0; t): Since,
as can readily be conrmed, GI(n; t) is negative at t = 0, concave and approaches zero
from above as t approaches t it follows that btI(n) constitutes a threshold such that
GI(n; t) < 0 when t < btI(n), but G1(n; t) > 0 when btI(n) < t < t, thus conrming
the result for international merger.
The Proposition establishes that from an initial equilibrium in which there is
international trade then, whatever the market structure, there is no incentive for
domestic merger. However, with an international merger the situation is somewhat
di¤erent. Specically, the Proposition admits the possibility that mergers from even
6
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relatively competitive markets may be protable provided that trade costs are of an
appropriate magnitude. The following gure illustrates this in the case of a = 1 where
it can be seen that for combinations of trade cost and initial concentration between
the locus t and the locus btI ; international mergers are protable.
2.2 Merger Initiating Trade
When a merger takes place from autarky (i.e. t > t) the resulting change in market
structure may initiate trade. To understand this e¤ect, let Xi and X

j denote
the total volume of exports from i to j and j to i respectively. Using (5) for the
representative rm in i; and an equivalent expression for that in j, these are given by
Xi (ni; nj; t) =
ni(a  t(nj + 1))
ni + nj + 1
(17)
and
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Xj (ni; nj; t) =
nj(a  t(ni + 1))
ni + nj + 1
: (18)
With a symmetric initial structure with n rms in each country, the ows of
exports from i to j and j to i following a domestic merger in country i are, respectively,
XDi (n; t) = max

0;
(a  t(n+ 1))(n  1)
2n

(19)
and
XDj (n; t) = max

0;
a  nt
2

: (20)
Inspection of (19) and (20) reveals that the former is positive for t < t whilst the
latter is positive for t < tA where
tA  a
n
: (21)
Thus, if t lies in the range t < t < tA a domestic merger in country i will initiate
a one-way ow of trade from j to i.
Consider now an international merger. As explained above, this has the e¤ect of
reducing by one the number of exporters serving each market but leaving the number
of domestic producers unchanged. Assuming a symmetric initial structure with n
rms in each country and using, (17) and (18), we can write the post-merger trade
ows as
XIi (n; t) = max

0;
(a  t(n+ 1))(n  1)
2n

(22)
and
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XIj (n; t) = max

0;
(a  t(n+ 1))(n  1)
2n

: (23)
For either of these ows to be positive requires t < t, which is the same condition
that pertained pre-merger. An international merger will thus neither initiate, nor
cause the cessation of, trading.
We may thus consider whether from a position of autarky, but where t < tA, a
domestic merger is protable. The gain from such a merger is
GDA(n; t) = ii(ni   1; nj; t)  2A(ni) (24)
and, in rather special circumstances, this may be positive as the following Proposition
establishes.
Proposition 2 For n = 2 there exists a threshold level of trade costs, btD, such that
GDA(n; t) > 0 when btD < t < tA(n): In all other circumstances, GDA(n; t) < 0.
Proof. After setting ni = nj = n, substituting from (11) and (7) into GDA(n; t)
reveals directly that this is negative for n > 2: Setting n = 2 and solvingGDA(n; t) = 0
for t yields a critical (zero-gain) value for trade cost of btD = a(4
p
2 3)
6 : Since G
DA(n; t)
is increasing in t it follows that for btD < t < tA(n) it is positive, thus establishing the
claim.
The Proposition demonstrates that for trade costs in the range where a domestic
merger would initiate trade, duopoly is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for
the merger to be protable. This contrasts to the position under autarky where,
as established by Salant Switzer and Reynolds, a bilateral merger from duopoly is
always protable.
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3 Conclusions
In their autarky setting, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) demonstrated that a
merger would be protable if there were two rms in the initial Cournot equilibrium,
but not if there were three or more rms. We show that in an open economy with
international trade, the condition for a domestic merger to be protable becomes
more restrictive. Specically, duopoly is no longer a su¢ cient condition for a merger
to be protable; an additional requirement is that trade costs exceed a threshold level.
An international merger, by contrast, can be protable from any market structure,
provided again that trade costs lie in a certain range.
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